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ABSTRACT: Most of the population of less developed countries (LDCs) now
lives in countries with national family planning programs to reduce fertility and
improve family welfare. Such programs are a new phenomenon. In some LDCs
increasing birth-control practice and fertility declines occurred along with
considerable social and economic development, but even there rapid changes
among the disadvantaged masses are generally associated with strong family
planning programs. Fertility has also fallen in some countries with only some
development but with vigorous family planning programs. China, Indonesia, Sri
Lanka, and Thailand are such cases. In such places as sub-Saharan Africa and
South Asia, fertility generally remains quite high, apparently because of little
development and traditional familial institutions. Even in these situations,
however, there are examples of significant fertility declines, in some cases
nationally and in other cases in intensive, high-quality pilot projects that have
established the latent demand for family planning.
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BY 1983, 76 percent of the population of less developed countries (LDCs)
lived in countries with official policies and
national family planning programs to re-
duce their population growth by reducing
fertility.’ An additional 17 percent lived in
countries that officially supported family
planning programs to improve the health
and welfare of their mothers and children.
Such national policies and family plan-
ning programs are a new phenomenon. In
1960 only one country, India, had such a
program and that was ineffectual. At that
time probably less than 10 percent of the
married women of childbearing age in
LDCs were using contraception and much
of that practice was ineffective. By 1985
an estimated 45 percent -about 400 mil-
lion women-were using contraception,
and 80 percent of that practice involved
such effective methods as the contracep-
tive pill, the intrauterine device (IUD),
and sterilization. The most widely used
method in LDCs, as in the world as a
whole, is now sterilization.’
These massive increases in contracep-
tive prevalence in just a few decades are
remarkable, because they have required
profound changes in reproductive behavior
deeply rooted in traditional familial insti-
tutions and in values about intimate sexual
relationships. Although these changes are
impressive, further large increases in con-
traceptive use in LDCs are necessary if
LDC fertility is to reach the low levels
required by the population policies of most
LDC countries and the population projec-
tions of the United Nations.
While the contraceptive prevalence
rates were rising in LDCs between 1960-65
and 1980-85, the fertility rates were falling,
partly because of rising age at marriage
but mainly because of deliberate fertility
limitation within marriage. The total fertil-
ity rate fell from 6.1 to 4.2, a 31 percent
decline.3
Despite the decline in fertility, the de-
cline in the rate of population growth in
LDCs as a whole has been small, because
there was a simultaneous decline in mortal-
ity, which largely offset the fertility decline.
The contraceptive prevalence rates
cited for all LDCs are weighted averages
of widely varying country rates. The rates
are moderately to very high in all of East
Asia and in parts of Southeast Asia-over
65 percent in China, Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, Korea, and Taiwan and close to 50
percent in Indonesia. In Latin America the
overall rate is 54 percent, with especially
high rates in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia,
and Costa Rica, moderate rates - 40 to 60
percent - in most other countries, but a rate
as low as 7 percent in Haiti. The prevalence
rates are almost uniformly low and fertility
rates very high in sub-Saharan Africa and
in much of the Islamic population of the
Near East and Southwest Asia. Even in
these regions, where conditions for fertility
decline are believed to be very unfavor-
able, exceptions are beginning to appear.
There have been significant increases in
contraceptive use and declines in fertility
1. Dorothy L. Nortman, Population and Family
Planning Programs: A Compendium of Data through
1983 (New York: Population Council, 1985), p. 32.
2. United Nations, Levels and Trends of Contra-
ceptive Use as Assessed in 1988 (New York: United
Nations, 1989). Unless otherwise indicated, contra-
ceptive prevalence rates are from this source.
3. United Nations, World Population Prospects,
1988 (New York: United Nations, 1989), p. 150. The
total fertility rate estimates the number of children
each woman would have if she lived through the
childbearing years, subject to fertility rates at each
childbearing age for the specified year.
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in Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Kenya re-
cently.4 In the Muslim world there are sim-
ilar examples in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt,’
and in some fundamentalist Islamic re-
gions of Indonesia.
CAUSES OF THE RISE IN
CONTRACEPTIVE PREVALENCE
The causes of such variability in contra-
ceptive use and fertility levels are matters
of controversy.
Twenty-five years ago, based on the
rapid fertility decline in the West between
about 1870 and World War II, most schol-
ars believed that the answer was simple.
Social and economic development, urban-
ization, higher educational levels, work in
the modern, nonfamilial economy, and
lower mortality increased the cost and de-
creased the benefits of children. They also
increased the value of investing more in a
smaller number of children, so that small
families planned with the use of contracep-
tion became the norm. There is an impor-
tant element of truth in these ideas. When
social and economic development levels
are high, small families and birth control
are widely prevalent.
In recent decades, however, empirical
studies have indicated that explaining the
causes of the transition from high to low
fertility is not so simple. Historical studies
have demonstrated that fertility decline
began in various parts of Europe under
widely varying social and economic condi-
tions and without modern contraceptives or
family planning programs.’ Whether fertil-
ity did decline was also considerably influ-
enced by such cultural factors as secular-
ism, language, and ethnicity.
A growing body of evidence from the
experience of LDCs since 1960 also indi-
cates that the adoption of birth control and
fertility declines occur under a variety of
conditions. Massive changes in reproduc-
tive behavior appear to be influenced not
only by the changing demand for children
and for family planning methods but also
in some cases by the supply of birth-control
services and information, by both orga-
nized programs and the private sector.
The World Fertility Survey in 42 LDCs
found that such structural variables as ed-
ucation, labor force activity, and urbaniza-
tion have only modest relations to contra-
ceptive use and fertility across Third World
countries. Further, the relationships that do
exist vary greatly between the regions of
the world.’
Ahypothesis receiving increasing atten-
tion is that diffusion of ideas about the con-
cept, means, prevalence, and legitimacy of
birth control plays an important role in
fertility decline. This ideational factor may
be particularly important for present-day
LDCs, because the earlier development
and practice of these ideas in the West is
part of world history and is carried by the in-
ternational mass-media network. Spread-
ing this set of ideas is an essential function
of family planning programs.
4. Data about recent levels of contraceptive
practice and fertility in this article for the following
countries are from the ongoing surveys of the Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys, Institute for Resource
Development, Columbia, MD: Botswana, Burundi,
Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Thailand,
Togo, and Zimbabwe.
5. Philippe Fargues, "La baisse de la f&eacute;condit&eacute;
arabe," Population, 43(6):987 (Nov.-Dec. 1988).
6. For example, Ansley J. Coale and Susan C.
Watkins, eds., The Decline of Fertility in Europe
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
7. German Rodriguez and John Cleland,
"Socio-Economic Determinants of Marital Fertility in
20 Countries: A Multivariate Analysis," in World Fer-
tility Survey Conference, 1980: Record of Proceed-
ings (London: World Fertility Survey, 1981), 2:337-
403.
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Fertility declines in LDCs do not always
involve organized national family plan-
ning programs. Notable fertility declines in
Latin America - for example, in Brazil -
have occurred with the assistance of pri-
vate organizations or individual contacts
with pharmacies and doctors.
A variety of studies have attempted to
determine the extent to which family plan-
ning programs have produced fertility de-
clines in addition to what would have hap-
pened anyway as a result of social and
economic development. For example,
Lapham and Mauldin, in a study of 93
LDCs, reported that socioeconomic devel-
opment and family planning program ef-
fort each had an independent effect on con-
traceptive use and fertility decline. But the
major reported effect was a joint product of
the two forces.’
It is illustrative of the problems in such
attempts at a comprehensive answer that
this one has been criticized on the grounds,
among others, that countries that already
have declining fertility mount strong pro-
grams that are, then, more the effect than
the cause of the fertility decline.
The issue is complicated by the fact that
countries with little social and economic
development generally have very weak
family planning programs, presumably be-
cause they do not have the infrastructure
required for this or other development pro-
grams. All the 22 countries ranked lowest
on socioeconomic development indices in
the Lapham-Mauldin study are also ranked
as having weak or very weak family plan-
ning programs.
I believe that, on balance, the evidence
is that family planning programs can have
an effect that is interdependent with, but
not merely reflective of, social and eco-
nomic development. There is, however,
no firm consensus among scholars in
the population field on this important
issue.
Since a simple cross-cultural explana-
tion of all LDCs still escapes us, it may be
the better part of wisdom to consider groups
of countries with common elements.
I will be referring to effective family
planning programs-those that are suc-
cessful in enabling large numbers of cou-
ples to have the number of children they
want when they want them. For countries
that have a policy to reduce the rate of
population growth, an effective program
also motivates enough couples to limit
family size so that national fertility rates
fall. This may involve education, mass-
media programs, various types of incen-
tives, and social and political pressure.
Such activist programs to change values
and behavior are sometimes controversial
both within the countries and in the world
arena.
LDCs WITH RAPID DEVELOPMENT
Fertility rates certainly have fallen es-
pecially rapidly in countries with consider-
able social and economic development as
well as effective family planning pro-
grams - Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and
Mexico are examples. It is probable that in
the long run fertility would have fallen in
such countries with or without family plan-
ning programs. It is doubtful, however, that
the decline would have been as rapid with-
out the family planning programs, espe-
cially among the disadvantaged masses -
the poor, the uneducated, and the rural.
8. Robert J. Lapham and W. Parker Mauldin,
"The Effects of Family Planning on Fertility: Re-
search Findings," in Organizing for Effective Family
Planning Programs, ed. R. J. Lapham and G. B.
Simmons (Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1987), pp. 647-80.
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For example, consider the case of Tai-
wan, a pioneer in both family planning and
other development programs.’ In 1960, just
before the program was begun, the total
fertility rate was about 6 and contraceptive
use was still at low levels. By 1986, only
26 years later, the fertility rate had fallen
by 70 percent to 1.7-below replacement
levels-and virtually all women were
using contraception before the end of their
childbearing years. The level of contracep-
tive use doubled from 28 to 56 percent
between 1965 and 1970. More important,
among illiterate women contraceptive use
during this period increased from 19 to 51 1
percent. By 1975, the differentials in con-
traceptive use between strata defined by
education, urbanization, or income had vir-
tually disappeared. No doubt the success of
Taiwan’s program was interdependent with
its rapid social and economic development,
but it is unlikely that the disadvantaged
masses - the poor, rural, and illiterate-
would have adopted family planning so
rapidly without the family planning pro-
gram. Even in 1985, 60 percent of Tai-
wanese couples were getting their con-
traceptive services through the government
programs.
Taiwan also illustrates the fact that a
rapid change in reproductive behavior can
occur despite persistence of traditional fa-
milial institutions. Even in 1985, when fer-
tility was very low and contraceptive prev-
alence very high, a large majority of older
Taiwanese were living with married sons
and about two-thirds of recently married
couples began married life living with the
husbands’ parents. 10
The sharp fertility reduction in the West
before World War II, without either modem
contraceptives or organized programs,
often is cited as evidence that those are
unnecessary for fertility decline if develop-
ment is sufficient. It is plausible, however,
that, had organized programs with modem
contraceptives been available in Europe,
fertility might have fallen more rapidly,
more equally among social groups, and




There is another group of countries in
which some social and economic condi-
tions were considered to be unfavorable
prior to their programs and fertility declines.
The most conspicuous example is
China, where fertility declines of unprece-
dented magnitude and speed have occurred
under presumably unfavorable social and
economic conditions but with a massive
family planning program of awesome ef-
fectiveness. Between 1970, when the rural
family planning program began in earnest,
and 1980 the fertility rate of rural China fell
from 6.3 to 2.9, a 53 percent decline. For
rural illiterate women, fertility fell by 50
percent, from 6.6 for the years 1967-70 to
3.3 for 1979-82. China’s fertility program
is unprecedented for its massive apparatus
and effectiveness. It depends on the ability
of the government to mobilize and control
the behavior of the masses at the village9. Ming-Cheng Chang, Ronald Freedman, and
Te-Hsiung Sun, "Trends in Fertility, Family Size Pref-
erences and Family Planning Practice: Taiwan, 1961-
85," Studies in Family Planning, 18(6):320-37 (Nov.-
Dec. 1987).
10. Maxine Weinstein et al., "Household Compo-
sition, Extended Kinship, and Reproduction in Tai-
wan : 1965-1985," Population Studies, in press.
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level, all the more remarkable because of
the hundreds of thousands of villages in-
volved, with 800 million rural people dis-
tributed over a vast area. No doubt, remark-
able preceding reductions in mortality and
more modest but significant gains in edu-
cation and other social changes are rele-
vant. The close connection in the timing of
the sharp fertility decline and the onset of
the rural program and its simultaneous oc-
currence in all major sectors of the popula-
tion make it highly probable, however, that
the program was a major force in the rapid
decline.
Questions can be raised about degrees
of coercion in the Chinese program. Nev-
ertheless, it is important and unexpected
that a program could mobilize the infra-
structure, bureaucratic apparatus, and the
masses of the population to produce such a
large and rapid fertility decline. The ab-
sence of such capacity in such countries as
India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan may ac-
count in part for the ineffectiveness of their
family planning programs.
Indonesia’s fertility decline and its rise
in contraceptive prevalence also has oc-
curred under initially rather unfavorable
social and economic conditions. Contra-
ceptive prevalence rates have risen from
about 2 percent, when the program began
in 1970, to 48 percent in 1987. During the
same period, fertility fell from an estimated
5.5, during the years 1967-70, to 3.3. Like
China, Indonesia has utilized its long-
standing institutional capacity to mobilize
the village masses for its family planning
programs, where the traditional authority
of the village leader and organized peer
pressure have played an important role.
Warwick, in an intensive study of Indo-
nesia’s program, has made a convincing
case that its distinctive program strategy
and aggressive implementation have had a
major independent effect that cannot be
accounted for by the significant social and
economic development gains that have
also occurred there since 1970.&dquo;
Thailand is another country whose rapid
fertility decline to very low levels and in-
creasing contraceptive prevalence to high
levels have occurred with a very strong
program and only moderately favorable
socioeconomic conditions.’2
In the Indian state of Kerala and in Sri
Lanka, improvements in health, education,
and minimal subsistence supports have
been associated with lower fertility levels
and moderately high contraceptive preva-
lence, despite low and lagging levels of
economic development. In both cases in-




Finally, we consider places with little
socioeconomic development and weak in-
frastructure, where individuals still receive
most of their physical and emotional sup-
port from familial institutions and where
children are perceived to yield significant
benefits as compared to their costs. The
status of women is poor and often depends
on their fertility. Most of the countries of
sub-Saharan Africa are in this category,
along with India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
11. Donald P. Warwick, "The Indonesian Family
Planning Program: Government Influence and Client
Choice," Population and Development Review,
12(3):453-90 (Sept. 1986).
12. John Knodel, Aphichat Chamratrithirong,
and Nibhon Debavalya, Thailand’sReproductiveRev-
olution: Rapid Fertility Decline in a Third-World
Setting (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1987).
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and smaller countries of Southwest Asia.
The countries in this group that have family
planning programs have not been very suc-
cessful in increasing contraceptive preva-
lence enough to decrease fertility very
much.
Low contraceptive prevalence and high
fertility in such countries are generally ex-
plained on the ground that having many
children, and especially sons, is regarded
as a positive good. The question of demand
for fertility control simply does not arise
for most families. According to this view,
family planning programs are inevitably
ineffective in these places, because there is
no significant demand for their services.
On the other hand, advocates of the
potential of family planning programs
argue that in many such countries there is
at least some latent demand for family
planning services, but that it does not be-
come manifest because the family planning
system is weak, with poor-quality services
provided in ways that are inappropriate for
the local culture.
The largest among these countries,
India, with more than 800 million people,
is important not only because of its size but
also because it has had a family planning
program for decades and has given it high
priority at least since 1966. Although nei-
ther its fertility nor family planning data
are of good quality, a probable consensus
among informed observers is that there has
been a modest rise in contraceptive prev-
alence and a comparably modest fall in
fertility, especially in the last 15 years.
According to estimates of the Indian De-
partment of Family Planning, contracep-
tive prevalence rose from 4 percent in 1967
to 38 percent in 1987. Variation in such
contraceptive prevalence rates between 352
districts, including most of India’s popula-
tion, has been shown to be modestly corre-
lated to female literacy and rural electrifi-
cation, but its relation to family planning
program effort is unknown.
India’s program has gone through many
permutations in the last twenty years. This,
together with the great variation in cultural,
caste, economic, and social strata in this
vast country, makes it difficult to summa-
rize the program’s problems. Nevertheless,
there probably is a consensus among most
Indian and foreign observers that the pro-
gram has been poorly executed.&dquo; One In-
dian official some years ago told me, &dquo;The
Indian program hasn’t failed. It hasn’t been
carried out.&dquo;
The program has been criticized for:
- an obsession with targets for the pro-
gram and for each worker set at such
high levels and so obviously unat-
tainable as to demoralize personnel;
- too much concentration on one dras-
tic method-sterilization-linked to
a controversial incentive program;
- rotating its district family planning
and other officers among posts so
often as to impede continuity in a
long-run program; and
- the fact that officials at central and
state and even district levels are not
in touch with the realities of life at
the village level, unlike the cases of
Indonesia and China, which coun-
tries use ties to those grass-roots lev-
els very effectively.
On the positive side is the fact that 72
districts are reported to have contraceptive
prevalence rates of 50 percent or higher
and 18 have rates of 60 percent or more.
13. In an address to a meeting of the International
Union for the Scientific Study of Population in New
Delhi in September 1989, Prime Minister Rajiv Gan-
dhi admitted that the Indian program has fallen far
short of aspirations because of bureaucratic bungling
and inflexibility in the face of large local variations in
the social situation.
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Even if discounted for overreporting, these
data suggest that some combination of fa-
vorable conditions and possibly better pro-
gram implementation are found in some
districts, which might provide models for
other districts.
Unfortunately, despite India’s consider-
able intellectual and scientific resources,
there has been no sustained effort to learn
what combination of specific developmen-
tal and cultural conditions, program de-
sign, and program implementation can ac-
count for these successes or for India’s
failure to be more generally successful in
attaining its own goals for its population
program.
Pakistan, with 115 million people, has a
very low contraceptive rate, recently esti-
mated at only 9 percent, and a fertility rate
of about 6. Although it has had a family
planning program for several decades, it has
been a low-priority, poorly implemented
program. The combination of low levels of
social and economic development, a patri-
archal, familistic culture, religious barriers,
and an ineffective family planning program
makes its lack of progress toward its pro-
fessed lower-fertility goals understandable.
Bangladesh, with more than 100 million
people, has the low developmental levels
and the cultural barriers that characterize
Pakistan. While its contraceptive preva-
lence rate of 25 percent is significantly
higher than Pakistan’s and many women
report wanting no more children on fertility
surveys, respected observers have asserted
that familial institutional supports for high
fertility make early fertility declines un-
likely. In Bangladesh, however, a carefully
monitored pilot project in Matlab seems to
have demonstrated that an intensive, high-
quality family planning service program
can make a significant difference even in
such unfavorable circumstances.14 The
project brought contraceptive prevalence
up from very little to 45 percent, with a
commensurate fall in fertility. Attempts are
now being made to extend into new areas
the essentials of what was learned in
Matlab. Initial results are encouraging but
not conclusive.
At Chogoria, in Kenya, a medical mis-
sionary hospital mounted a family plan-
ning program with some similarities to the
project in Matlab.15 There, too, contracep-
tive prevalence has been brought up to the
40 percent level. Statements indicating a
potential demand have been tested with a
good-quality service program and found to
be real.
Skeptical evaluations of the prospects
for fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africa
have been applied to Kenya as well.16 A re-
cent survey in Kenya has, however, shown
a significant 50 percent rise in contracep-
tive prevalence between 1984 and 1989,
with an accompanying fall in fertility from
7.7 to 6.7. By 1989, 40 percent of married
women as young as 25-29 years old said
they wanted no more children and 36 per-
cent said that they wanted to postpone the
next child for at least two years. The
Chogoria test and the recent survey suggest
that these statements are meaningful.
14. Michael A. Koenig et al., "Trends in Family
Size Preferences and Contraceptive Use in Matlab,
Bangladesh," Studies in Family Planning, 18(3):117-
27 (May-June 1987).
15. Howard I. Goldberg, Malcolm McNeil, and
Alison Spitz, "Contraceptive Use and Fertility De-
cline in Chogoria, Kenya," Studies in Family Plan-
ning, 20(1):17-25 (Jan.-Feb. 1989).
16. Odile Frank and Geoffrey McNicoll, "An
Interpretation of Fertility and Population Policy,"
Population and Development Review, 13(2):209-43
(June 1987).
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In many sub-Saharan countries the
basic infrastructure is weak, and there is a
severe shortage of professional personnel.
Small-scale investigations, often less in-
tensive and rigorous than the cited pilot
projects, have been used to develop and test
provisionally the feasibility of locally ap-
propriate service programs. In one such
program in the Sudan, contraceptive prev-
alence rates were reported as rising from 9
to 25 percent in eight years, and replication
yielded similar results in four years.&dquo;
In many poor, high-fertility LDCs, in-
cluding Bangladesh and Kenya, lower
mortality means higher child survival, so
that many LDC women, by the time they
are about 30, already have alive the number
of children they want. The increasing num-
ber of living children in each family creates
pressure on traditional institutions devel-
oped on the implicit assumption that many
children would die.
At the same time, increasing numbers of
Third World citizens are getting new ideas
from the expanding world network of com-
munication, transportation, and economic
interdependence, whose influence increas-
ingly reaches into even LDC villages.
These ideas include new facts and models
about reproductive behavior but, just as
important, about health, the value of edu-
cation, new consumption goods, and polit-
ical power. Such new ideas generate rising
aspirations among parents, both for them-
selves and for their children, although the
pace of such changes varies enormously
from place to place. The conventional wis-
dom has been that poor, illiterate LDC
peasants are unlikely to be interested in
birth control, but under the changing con-
ditions induced by the greater survival of
children and the impact of new ideas, that
wisdom may be less generally valid than in
earlier days. Anational survey in Indonesia
in 1976 found unexpectedly that new con-
traceptive practice was considerable
among the rural, the poor, the uneducated,
and the residents of backward villages. 18
It is in such situations that increasing
numbers of women with years of child-
bearing still ahead are saying on surveys
that they want no more children. This does
not mean that they have all made defin-
ite, unambiguous decisions. Some have,
but much larger numbers are under cross-
pressures between traditional values and
institutions and new realities and ideas. A
good family planning information and ser-
vice program helps to crystallize latent de-
mand for contraception by emphasizing the
usefulness and legitimacy of family plan-
ning as a partial solution for the problems
of families.
The pilot studies at Matlab and Chogo-
ria and declining fertility in several African
countries are indications of the potential
for successes in at least some places where
success is believed, a priori, to be very
unlikely. This does not mean, however, that
high contraceptive prevalence and lower
fertility can be achieved everywhere where
social and cultural conditions apparently
are unfavorable.
PROSPECTS AND POLICIES IN
POORLY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
There is, in fact, little doubt that tradi-
tional familial institutions, low develop-
17. Operations Research Program, Africa:ANew
Frontier in Family Planning (New York: Columbia
University, Center for Population and Family Health,
1988). The term "operations research," designating
rigorous quantitative work in some other fields, is less
appropriate for some of these projects.
18. Ronald Freedman, S. E. Khoo, and B. Suprap-
tilah, "Use of Modern Contraceptives in Indonesia: A
Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom," Interna-
tional Family Planning Perspectives, 7(1):3-15 (Mar.
1981).
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ment levels, poor infrastructure, and short-
ages of indigenous professional personnel
and of other resources make early rapid
fertility declines unlikely in places like Pa-
kistan and much of sub-Saharan Africa.
For example, surveys in 1986 and 1987 in
Mali, Burundi, Liberia, Senegal, and Togo
found that the number of children women
wanted were, on average, similar to the
number they were having-six to seven.
Under these difficult circumstances, it
is particularly unpromising to attempt to
implement national plans for uniform pro-
grams across a country without regard to
local readiness, ethnic and tribal differ-
ences, trained personnel locally accept-
able, and adequate supplies of appropriate
contraceptives and other resources. It
seems to be more rational to begin with
selective program initiatives in promising
local areas and population strata and for
purposes meeting manifest local needs.
Pilot projects, such as that in Matlab,
Bangladesh, or the one in Chogoria,
Kenya, have the potential of testing for
latent demand in local areas, identifying
the subgroups that are interested, and de-
veloping culturally relevant programs to
meet the demand, if demand is found. Such
projects with intensive inputs may appear
to be expensive, but given the poor invest-
ment return from ineffective national pro-
grams in many poor LDCs, the investment
in pilot projects appears to be worthwhile.
Such pilot projects should be mounted in
situations where a success is likely. If the
possibility of an effective program is
gravely in question, it is plausible to begin
under favorable conditions with later ex-
pansion to more difficult places as confi-
dence, legitimation, and program models
develop.
In surveys in sub-Saharan Africa a con-
siderable number of women who are not
interested in restricting the number of their
children before having a large number say
that they would like to postpone their next
birth for at least two years. This suggests
that the initial use of contraception for
spacing rather than limiting births might
find significant numbers accepting contra-
ception, especially in the many African
countries in which prolonged sexual absti-
nence after a birth has been customary.
Some family planning programs in such
countries already are moving in that direc-
tion in combination with maternal and
child health services. Even if the total num-
ber of births women have remains un-
changed, lengthening the intervals be-
tween births has the effect of decreasing




LDCs get considerable support from de-
veloped countries and from the United Na-
tions, the World Bank, and other private
and public agencies.19 In 1985, about $512
million in such external support was com-
mitted. While the United States Agency for
International Development has made the
largest bilateral commitments, at least 16
other countries in 1985 made contribu-
tions, several of them giving more than the
United States when computed as a percent-
age of gross national product.
In most LDCs with family planning pro-
grams, such external financial assistance
has been important in providing foreign
exchange for purchasing contraceptives
and other supplies and equipment and has
also financed such infrastructure as clinics
and motor vehicles. To varying degrees
19. Dorothy L. Nortman, "External Funding for
Population Programs in Developing Countries, 1982-
1985," International Family Planning Perspectives,
14(1):2-8 (Mar. 1988).
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such support also pays for operating costs
of the programs. The value of technical
assistance from advisers provided by exter-
nal agencies is more controversial, but
there is little doubt that the external agen-
cies have played an important role in legit-
imating family planning programs through
dialogues with political leaders and in
other ways. External assistance has some-




One purpose of both pilot studies and
other soundings of latent demand in high-
fertility countries is early detection of the
effects of social changes. Traditional cul-
tural and institutional forces supporting
high fertility are not immune to the rapid
social changes sweeping the world. Social
scientists do much better at analyzing what
societies have been than what they are
becoming.
Recent rises in contraceptive preva-
lence and declines in fertility in places like
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Algeria
were not foreseen by most observers a few
years ago. Once fertility in LDCs has de-
clined by about 10 percent with more birth
control, in most cases the decline contin-
ues. This also was the earlier experience in
the West.
Most observers also did not foresee in
the 1960s the rapid demographic transfor-
mations of places like Taiwan, Korea, In-
donesia, China, and some Latin American
countries. That is because they did not fore-
see the scope and rapidity of the following
changes, which variously affected major
fertility and mortality decline: rapid social
and economic development, creation of
family planning programs effective in
reaching large parts of the population, le-
gitimation of the idea of birth-control
methods and of organized family planning
programs, and development of new birth-
control methods.
The prospects of effective family plan-
ning programs and fertility declines in spe-
cific high-fertility countries will depend on
the future scale of such changes in each
country as well as on other changes not
presently foreseen.
